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Rights We Have Lost
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<blockquote data-quote="Judge Bean" data-source="post: 6835" data-attributes="member: 42"><p><strong>Rights We Have Lost</strong></p><p></p><p><em><strong>Lawful Removal by Impeachment or Election</strong></em></p><p></p><p></p><p><span style="font-size: 9px"><em>The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. </em></span></p><p><span style="font-size: 9px"><em> James Madison, Jan. 30, 1788</em></span></p><p><span style="font-size: 9px"><em></em></span></p><p><span style="font-size: 9px"><em>The aim of every political Constitution is or ought to be first to obtain for rulers, men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue to hold their public trust. James Madison, Feb. 19, 1788</em></span></p><p> </p><p></p><p>The Constitution was not designed to safeguard against outright tyranny or monarchy <em>only</em>, but against the concentration of power as vested in any one class of persons, who can themselves and within the scope of their own interests choose their own representatives and successors. The power remains vested in the <em>people</em>, flows from and returns to them, through temporary leaders, who depend upon the approval of their masters. </p><p></p><p>If one elitist or restrictive group or class can capture the privilege of power for itself, and select its own related partners to temporarily carry the power on its behalf, it may be a bureaucracy, it may be a political faction, it may be a shadow caste of career governmentalists, but it may as well be a monarchical aristocracy—its characters come and go, but all of one interest in succession unbroken.</p><p> </p><p>The question arises as to whether they have taken hold in our system by means of a loophole in the law, or by sheer arrogance and greed, or both—but they have counted on too many Americans agreeing to be their lackeys. The Constitution is not an airtight, perfect instrument—only the best one available, and containing allowance for amendment. If it were otherwise, some of us would still be slaves and many more dead before their time. </p><p></p><p>The Constitution would not have failed to provide a remedy for the abuse of its delegation of power, and the Framers debated how best to limit the terms and exercise of power of the people’s temporary representatives. It provided the remedy of the impeachment of judges and elected officials. On the subject of recall it is silent; it must be a power reserved to the people or to the States, for no granted power gives the federal government the right to prohibit it, and it cuts contrary to sense and the scheme of the law to suggest that a representative of the people could forbid his own unscheduled recall. </p><p></p><p>Likewise a judge, charged to determine matters of Constitutional law without bias or prejudice, would not by the Framers have been assigned the power to secure his own tenure by mere judicial fiat. It must be true then that the Constitution leaves the decision to recall judges and representatives in the hands of the people, or with the States, as a final recourse if other measures fail.</p><p> </p><p>If the people would get up a vote and demand the removal of those in power, what law could resist the mandate? It is a supreme and preemptive law that renders the people the master of the government; we expect to find it in the Constitution itself. The Constitution by all rights should refer to or recognize the power of the people to recall the government; or if it does not, its imperfection shows and requires amendment.</p><p> </p><p>Nor can we expect the Constitution to insist upon armed revolution only as the sole means of overthrowing the unwanted leaders. We do not want them—but we are hardly required to shoot them. We demand their removal, and in fact retain the power to mount insurrection as a matter of law, if they do not capitulate, by virtue of the Second Amendment. The question is then How, or By what means, are they to be removed? </p><p></p><p>Patriotic Americans will need more than decades of scandal and embezzlement to take up arms against their own people again; but neither will they suffer to have their demands ignored, or their will thwarted with indefinite process. It is said that we are a nation of laws, not men—and by this is meant in part that we will not be governed by a cabal, a caste, an elite, a faction or conglomerate of interests, any more than by a dictator or king. </p><p></p><p>Instead we attempt to satisfy the rule of law, and judge and plan according to its understood meaning. The overriding meaning of the Constitution is that power lies permanently and originally in the citizens, who grant temporary and occasional delegation of it to individuals who are trusted to place no other interests above or against those of the people.</p><p> </p><p>Explicit Constitutional authority provides for the punishment of officials by removal for the commission of specified crimes. The accused official is discharged; and it has been enough on some occasions to prompt his resignation to only begin impeachment proceedings against one. It is therefore the intent of the law to punish certain persons in their roles as representatives, as an extrajudicial penalty, in addition to any ordinary legal penalty. </p><p></p><p>If impeachment were meant to call the offender to justice in any other capacity or role, it would be superfluous to the regular penal law. It is clearly therefore meant as a check to government action, and only in the case of specified high crimes or misdemeanors.</p><p> </p><p>When such offenses cannot by circumstances be charged to any individual, but to the entire branch or department in question, or the entire federal leadership, either due to the quiet succession of offices and inheritance of powers and interests, or the general dispersal of responsibility among many, the Constitutional provision would stand meaningless and futile if its original spirit and intent were not followed rather than its rigid outward form.</p><p> </p><p>The original intent and spirit of the impeachment clause is that misconduct by officials shall result in their discharge from office. When this provision is understood in combination with others providing for periodical elections (as the rules of interpretation require us to understand provisions of law together so as to make the best sense of them) we see, again, that the intent of the law of the land was to provide more than one means of removing unwanted persons from office. </p><p></p><p>Yet the two great devices together, impeachment and election, cannot encompass either all combinations of persons, or all three branches. Many hold office for life, or might as well; many make a career of inheriting and using political power; many are appointed, anonymous, secret, or entitled to perpetual privileges by custom and usage. Many are beyond the reach of impeachment. </p><p></p><p>The leadership of one of the three branches is appointed for life; that of another, accustomed to lifelong reelection; that of another, encompassed by overbearing, unidentified advisors and “handlers.” For all of these, impeachment, or loss of office by vote, holds little terror, and many have even demonstrated the ability to withstand undeniable public outcry for their removal.</p><p> </p><p>In the case of impeachment only, as a remedy, the criminal should not be able to delegate his power to others who would survive his own dismissal and approximate his policies and plans; the Constitution does not provide for the transfer of abused power to one who is not named in the indictment, the one charged then to receive the punishment himself and leave the corruption safe in others’ hands. </p><p></p><p>Furthermore in a system of checks and balances, the wrong is multiplied if committed with impunity. The approving and screening branches perpetuate the wrong by not correcting it, and feel their own authority over such matters atrophy. Congress could do nothing to punish Nixon when once he’d given power to one of their own, who in turn pardoned the president before the prosecution could commence. </p><p></p><p>When Americans look at the transaction, they should perhaps recognize it for what it apparently is—a trade, a quid pro quo, a fair exchange of favor and privilege—an illegal barter of the public trust, in order to hold the power of the people out of reach above their heads.</p><p> </p><p>Some will say that such instances of abuse are no better as examples than as worthy cases for prosecution due to their unique quality, and the passage of time. But once removed from their hands, the power of citizens is not returned—who would return it? For what reason? Has it been returned to us in fact? It has encouraged, just in the case of Nixon, a notion of the presidency as a kind of regency, or granted sinecure, to be passed from approved hand to approved hand. </p><p></p><p>It has encouraged the dilution of the impeachment clause such that it will be both invoked more often and used with less effect—as with the charges levied against Clinton. It has encouraged some to loosen the restriction of the high office to permit a third, perhaps a fourth term, or unlimited terms, as was bandied about in Reagan’s day (and would have resulted in George Bush inheriting the office by succession as Reagan grew enfeebled early in his third term). In such ways is the law weakened, and Machiavellian intrigue encouraged.</p><p> </p><p>The Framers wanted regular turnover of officers—it averts monarchy or tyranny, and other forms of nonresponsive rule. It must be assumed that this formed a part of the intent of the law as written which restricts federal officeholders, as it is reflected in the compromised schedule of periodic national elections. The law is such that one cannot hold the office of, say, Senator, unless he agrees to hold himself accountable for return to office or discharge after six years. </p><p></p><p>Did the Framers intend for this to be the only means of removing the Senator barring the commission of impeachable crimes? If they had been capable of seeing a future in which the turnover of many individuals, or their deaths or retirement from office, constituted at last overall a system in which nonresponsive government ruled, securing its powers and policies perpetually through successive managers and directors, the Senate being a conduit through which the power was sapped directly from its source in the people, what would they have done?</p><p> </p><p>It can be assumed with certainty that the Framers would have outlawed a system of governors and their agencies which will inevitably eventually represent none but their own will and needs. Permanent unelected career government officials, ensconced in bureaucracies, and elected ones who have no other avocation but public office, sap the strength and integrity of the system, and exist contrary to the nation’s fundamental laws.</p><p> </p><p>For the last resort, the Framers presumed revolution, which for them, by bitter recent experience, could only occur by violence. They taught us their law; we study it for a means of doing our duty of revolt without bloodshed, because we have faith that that would be what they meant and what they would have wanted for us.</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="Judge Bean, post: 6835, member: 42"] [b]Rights We Have Lost[/b] [i][b]Lawful Removal by Impeachment or Election[/b][/i] [SIZE=1][i]The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. James Madison, Jan. 30, 1788 The aim of every political Constitution is or ought to be first to obtain for rulers, men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue to hold their public trust. James Madison, Feb. 19, 1788[/i][/SIZE] The Constitution was not designed to safeguard against outright tyranny or monarchy [i]only[/i], but against the concentration of power as vested in any one class of persons, who can themselves and within the scope of their own interests choose their own representatives and successors. The power remains vested in the [i]people[/i], flows from and returns to them, through temporary leaders, who depend upon the approval of their masters. If one elitist or restrictive group or class can capture the privilege of power for itself, and select its own related partners to temporarily carry the power on its behalf, it may be a bureaucracy, it may be a political faction, it may be a shadow caste of career governmentalists, but it may as well be a monarchical aristocracy—its characters come and go, but all of one interest in succession unbroken. The question arises as to whether they have taken hold in our system by means of a loophole in the law, or by sheer arrogance and greed, or both—but they have counted on too many Americans agreeing to be their lackeys. The Constitution is not an airtight, perfect instrument—only the best one available, and containing allowance for amendment. If it were otherwise, some of us would still be slaves and many more dead before their time. The Constitution would not have failed to provide a remedy for the abuse of its delegation of power, and the Framers debated how best to limit the terms and exercise of power of the people’s temporary representatives. It provided the remedy of the impeachment of judges and elected officials. On the subject of recall it is silent; it must be a power reserved to the people or to the States, for no granted power gives the federal government the right to prohibit it, and it cuts contrary to sense and the scheme of the law to suggest that a representative of the people could forbid his own unscheduled recall. Likewise a judge, charged to determine matters of Constitutional law without bias or prejudice, would not by the Framers have been assigned the power to secure his own tenure by mere judicial fiat. It must be true then that the Constitution leaves the decision to recall judges and representatives in the hands of the people, or with the States, as a final recourse if other measures fail. If the people would get up a vote and demand the removal of those in power, what law could resist the mandate? It is a supreme and preemptive law that renders the people the master of the government; we expect to find it in the Constitution itself. The Constitution by all rights should refer to or recognize the power of the people to recall the government; or if it does not, its imperfection shows and requires amendment. Nor can we expect the Constitution to insist upon armed revolution only as the sole means of overthrowing the unwanted leaders. We do not want them—but we are hardly required to shoot them. We demand their removal, and in fact retain the power to mount insurrection as a matter of law, if they do not capitulate, by virtue of the Second Amendment. The question is then How, or By what means, are they to be removed? Patriotic Americans will need more than decades of scandal and embezzlement to take up arms against their own people again; but neither will they suffer to have their demands ignored, or their will thwarted with indefinite process. It is said that we are a nation of laws, not men—and by this is meant in part that we will not be governed by a cabal, a caste, an elite, a faction or conglomerate of interests, any more than by a dictator or king. Instead we attempt to satisfy the rule of law, and judge and plan according to its understood meaning. The overriding meaning of the Constitution is that power lies permanently and originally in the citizens, who grant temporary and occasional delegation of it to individuals who are trusted to place no other interests above or against those of the people. Explicit Constitutional authority provides for the punishment of officials by removal for the commission of specified crimes. The accused official is discharged; and it has been enough on some occasions to prompt his resignation to only begin impeachment proceedings against one. It is therefore the intent of the law to punish certain persons in their roles as representatives, as an extrajudicial penalty, in addition to any ordinary legal penalty. If impeachment were meant to call the offender to justice in any other capacity or role, it would be superfluous to the regular penal law. It is clearly therefore meant as a check to government action, and only in the case of specified high crimes or misdemeanors. When such offenses cannot by circumstances be charged to any individual, but to the entire branch or department in question, or the entire federal leadership, either due to the quiet succession of offices and inheritance of powers and interests, or the general dispersal of responsibility among many, the Constitutional provision would stand meaningless and futile if its original spirit and intent were not followed rather than its rigid outward form. The original intent and spirit of the impeachment clause is that misconduct by officials shall result in their discharge from office. When this provision is understood in combination with others providing for periodical elections (as the rules of interpretation require us to understand provisions of law together so as to make the best sense of them) we see, again, that the intent of the law of the land was to provide more than one means of removing unwanted persons from office. Yet the two great devices together, impeachment and election, cannot encompass either all combinations of persons, or all three branches. Many hold office for life, or might as well; many make a career of inheriting and using political power; many are appointed, anonymous, secret, or entitled to perpetual privileges by custom and usage. Many are beyond the reach of impeachment. The leadership of one of the three branches is appointed for life; that of another, accustomed to lifelong reelection; that of another, encompassed by overbearing, unidentified advisors and “handlers.” For all of these, impeachment, or loss of office by vote, holds little terror, and many have even demonstrated the ability to withstand undeniable public outcry for their removal. In the case of impeachment only, as a remedy, the criminal should not be able to delegate his power to others who would survive his own dismissal and approximate his policies and plans; the Constitution does not provide for the transfer of abused power to one who is not named in the indictment, the one charged then to receive the punishment himself and leave the corruption safe in others’ hands. Furthermore in a system of checks and balances, the wrong is multiplied if committed with impunity. The approving and screening branches perpetuate the wrong by not correcting it, and feel their own authority over such matters atrophy. Congress could do nothing to punish Nixon when once he’d given power to one of their own, who in turn pardoned the president before the prosecution could commence. When Americans look at the transaction, they should perhaps recognize it for what it apparently is—a trade, a quid pro quo, a fair exchange of favor and privilege—an illegal barter of the public trust, in order to hold the power of the people out of reach above their heads. Some will say that such instances of abuse are no better as examples than as worthy cases for prosecution due to their unique quality, and the passage of time. But once removed from their hands, the power of citizens is not returned—who would return it? For what reason? Has it been returned to us in fact? It has encouraged, just in the case of Nixon, a notion of the presidency as a kind of regency, or granted sinecure, to be passed from approved hand to approved hand. It has encouraged the dilution of the impeachment clause such that it will be both invoked more often and used with less effect—as with the charges levied against Clinton. It has encouraged some to loosen the restriction of the high office to permit a third, perhaps a fourth term, or unlimited terms, as was bandied about in Reagan’s day (and would have resulted in George Bush inheriting the office by succession as Reagan grew enfeebled early in his third term). In such ways is the law weakened, and Machiavellian intrigue encouraged. The Framers wanted regular turnover of officers—it averts monarchy or tyranny, and other forms of nonresponsive rule. It must be assumed that this formed a part of the intent of the law as written which restricts federal officeholders, as it is reflected in the compromised schedule of periodic national elections. The law is such that one cannot hold the office of, say, Senator, unless he agrees to hold himself accountable for return to office or discharge after six years. Did the Framers intend for this to be the only means of removing the Senator barring the commission of impeachable crimes? If they had been capable of seeing a future in which the turnover of many individuals, or their deaths or retirement from office, constituted at last overall a system in which nonresponsive government ruled, securing its powers and policies perpetually through successive managers and directors, the Senate being a conduit through which the power was sapped directly from its source in the people, what would they have done? It can be assumed with certainty that the Framers would have outlawed a system of governors and their agencies which will inevitably eventually represent none but their own will and needs. Permanent unelected career government officials, ensconced in bureaucracies, and elected ones who have no other avocation but public office, sap the strength and integrity of the system, and exist contrary to the nation’s fundamental laws. For the last resort, the Framers presumed revolution, which for them, by bitter recent experience, could only occur by violence. They taught us their law; we study it for a means of doing our duty of revolt without bloodshed, because we have faith that that would be what they meant and what they would have wanted for us. [/QUOTE]
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