The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's chairman, Gregory Jaczko, opposed licensing

[Opmmur]

Updated at 6 p.m. ET: It's been 34 years -- and several nuclear accidents later -- but a divided federal panel on Thursday licensed a utility to build nuclear reactors in the U.S. for the first time since 1978. The two reactors at this time even though he had earlier praised their design.

"There is still more work" to be done to ensure that lessons learned from Japan's Fukushima disaster last year are engrained in the reactor design, he told his colleagues. "I cannot support this licensing as if Fukushima never happened. I believe it requires some type of binding commitment that the Fukushima enhancements that are currently projected and currently planned to be made would be made before the operation of the facility."

"There is no amnesia," responded Commissioner Kristine Svinick, speaking for the 4-1 majority and noting that the industry has been directed to adopt those lessons. The licensing covers two reactors estimated to cost $14 billion that the Southern Company wants to add to its existing Vogtle nuclear plant in Georgia. Preliminary work has already begun and plans are for the first new reactor to be operating in 2016.

I also oppose new reactors in the US. NOT SAFE ask the Japan people.
Professor Opmmur

 

[Opmmur]

New Research On Japanese Quake Ominous For Pacific Northwest

By Physorg.com
Feb 21, 2012 - 4:53:47 PM

Scientists are still unraveling last year's giant Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and some of what they're finding doesn't bode well for the Pacific Northwest.


Detailed analyses of the way the Earth warped along the Japanese coast suggest that shaking from a Cascadia megaquake could be stronger than expected along the coasts of Washington, Oregon and British Columbia, researchers reported Sunday at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

"The Cascadia subduction zone can be seen as a mirror image of the Tohoku area," said John Anderson, of the University of Nevada.

Anderson compiled ground-motion data from the Japan quake and overlaid it on a map of the Pacific Northwest, which has a similar fault - called a subduction zone - lying offshore.

In Japan, the biggest jolts occurred underwater. The seafloor was displaced by 150 feet or more in some places, triggering the massive tsunami. But in the Northwest, it's the land that will be rocked hardest - because the Pacific coast here lies so close to the subduction zone.

"The ground motions that we have from Tohoku may actually be an indication that there could be much stronger shaking in the coastal areas of British Columbia, Washington and Oregon," Anderson said.

Cities like Seattle, Portland and Vancouver, B.C., are far enough from the coast that they might dodge the most violent hammering. But all of the urban areas sit on geologic basins that can amplify ground motion like waves in a bathtub.

"Basins shake more than hard rock," Anderson said. "Local site conditions can have an enormous effect on the nature of strong ground motions."

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) is already at work on a new analysis of how hard the ground is likely to shake and how close the rupture zone might come to urban areas the next time the Cascadia subduction zone really lets loose. The last time was in 1700, and the resulting quake was a magnitude-9 - just like the monster that struck Japan on March 11, 2010.

Japan's extensive network of seismometers, satellites, strain meters and GPS sensors logged a wealth of data that scientists continue to mine for insights.

"It's the best-recorded megaquake ever, and it's very relevant for the hazard in Cascadia," Anderson said.

Japanese scientists are struggling to answer several haunting questions: Why was the quake so big? How did the tsunami swell to such giant proportions? And why was it such a surprise to the world's most earthquake-savvy nation?

"It was very disheartening for people doing earthquake research and hazard mitigation in Japan," said Jim Mori, of Kyoto University's Disaster Prevention Research Institute.

Seismologists were fooled by a series of small quakes that rocked the area every 35 years or so, said Kenji Satake, of the University of Tokyo.

They believed each small quake relieved the pressure on the subduction zone - the boundary where two geologic plates slip past each other as the ocean floor shoves under the continent.

Now they realize strain continues to build until the series of small quakes is punctuated by a giant one about every 700 years. Similar quakes and tsunamis struck in the years 869 and 1896, but Japanese scientists failed to look far enough into their own history, Satake said. "We needed longer time records."

The longest record for a subduction zone is from Cascadia, where scientists have linked buried marshes and submarine landslides with a series of about 22 megaquake quakes going back 10,000 years. The time between quakes ranges from 200 to 1,000 years, with an average of about 500 years.

There's no obvious "supercyle" of supergiant quakes, as Satake suggests, in Japan. But it is clear that quakes on Cascadia have varied in size, said USGS scientist Brian Atwater. Some geologists argue the magnitude-9 quake 300 years ago was simply average and that the Northwest has been slammed by quakes twice as big in the distant past.

Most earthquake scenarios for the Northwest coast project tsunamis of about 30 feet, and scientists still don't know how much that needs to be ratcheted up post-Tohoku. Walls of water up to 120 feet high washed away entire communities on the Japanese coast.

"Does Cascadia also have a 40-meter tsunami coming onshore?" Mori asked.

Several of the yardsticks used to gauge the risk on subduction zones were proved questionable in Japan, he added.

Foremost among them is the measurement of strain buildup, as reflected by bulging and sinking land masses. Scientists had hoped they could identify fault segments that are about to snap - but the tension on the Japan subduction zone was not remarkable, Mori said.

Scientists are rethinking which subduction zones are most dangerous, said Kelin Wang, of the Geological Survey of Canada.

One emerging theory suggests seafloor topography might be key. Oceanic plates dotted with mountains seem to hang up and slip more frequently as they scrape under continental plates, he explained.

The result is a series of smaller quakes that occur when segments of the fault break. Giant quakes seem to occur most frequently where the seafloor is smooth and featureless - as off the Northwest coast, Wang said. With no surface bumps and hills to interfere, the two plates can stick together over vast distances, he said. When they slip, the whole fault breaks at once.

The nuclear-power industry around the world is still dealing with fallout from the meltdowns at Japan's Fukushima nuclear complex, said Stuart Nishenko, of Pacific Gas and Electric, which operates the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant on the California coast.

Seven nations, including Switzerland, Germany and Mexico, opted to either phase out nuclear power or halt construction of new plants. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is preparing to issue orders to all of the nation's 104 nuclear reactors, requiring new seismic safety analyses, Nishenko said.

Operators also will be required to walk through their plants with inspectors, looking for any parts or systems vulnerable to earthquakes or floods, and to upgrade plans for coping with a complete loss of power, as happened when the Japanese tsunami knocked out electrical lines and flooded backup generators.

The Northwest's only nuclear power plant is the Columbia Generating Station, located on the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. In recent years, geologists have discovered several new faults running through the area, capable of generating earthquakes as big as magnitude 7.5. Plant operators recently applied for a license extension to operate the 28-year-old reactor though 2023.
Earth Changes Media

 

[Opmmur]

What are the odds? US nuke plants ranked by quake risk
So much for San Andreas: Reactors in East, Midwest, South have highest chance of damage

By Bill Dedman Investigative reporter msnbc.com


What are the odds that a nuclear emergency like the one at Fukushima Dai-ichi could happen in the central or eastern United States? They'd have to be astronomical, right? As a pro-nuclear commenter on msnbc.com put it this weekend, "There's a power plant just like these in Omaha. If it gets hit by a tsunami...."

It turns out that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has calculated the odds of an earthquake causing catastrophic failure to a nuclear plant here. Each year, at the typical nuclear reactor in the U.S., there's a 1 in 74,176 chance of an earthquake strong enough to cause damage to the reactor's core, which could expose the public to radiation. No tsunami required. That's 10 times more likely than you winning $10,000 by buying a single ticket in the Powerball multistate lottery, where the chance is 1 in 723,145.

And it turns out that the nuclear reactor in the United States with the highest risk of an earthquake causing core damage is not the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, with its twin reactors tucked between the California coastline and the San Andreas Fault.

It's not the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, a four-hour drive down the Pacific coast at San Clemente, surrounded by fault lines on land and under the ocean.
It's not on the Pacific Coast at all. It's on the Hudson River.

One in 10,000

The reactor with the highest risk rating is 24 miles north of New York City, in the village of Buchanan, N.Y., at the Indian Point Energy Center. There, on the east bank of the Hudson, Indian Point nuclear reactor No. 3 has the highest risk of earthquake damage in the country, according to new NRC risk estimates provided to msnbc.com.

A ranking of the nation's 104 commercial nuclear reactors is shown at the bottom of this article, listing the NRC estimate of risk of an earthquake causing core damage.

The chance of an earthquake causing core damage at Indian Point 3 is estimated at 1 in 10,000 each year. Under NRC guidelines, that's right on the verge of requiring "immediate concern regarding adequate protection" of the public. The two reactors at Indian Point generate up to one-third of the electricity for New York City. The second reactor, Indian Point 2, doesn't rate as risky, with 1 chance in 30,303 each year.

The plant with the second highest risk? It's in Massachusetts. Third? Pennsylvania. Then Tennessee, Pennsylvania again, Florida, Virginia and South Carolina. Only then does California's Diablo Canyon appear on the list, followed by Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island.
The odds take into consideration two main factors: the chance of a serious quake, and the strength of design of the plant.

Nuclear power plants built in the areas usually thought of as earthquake zones, such as the California coastline, have a surprisingly low risk of damage from those earthquakes. Why? They built anticipating a major quake.

Other plants in the East, South and Midwest, where the design standards may have been lower because the earthquake risk was thought to be minimal, now find themselves at the top of the NRC's danger list.

The chance of an earthquake that would cause core damage ranges from Indian Point's 1 chance in 10,000 each year, a relatively higher risk, to the Callaway nuclear plant in Fulton, Mo., where the NRC set the lowest risk, 1 chance in 500,000 each year.

Playing the odds

The NRC, the federal agency responsible for nuclear power safety, says the odds are in the public's favor. "Operating nuclear power plants are safe," the NRC said when it reported the new risk estimates.

Every plant is designed with a margin of safety beyond the strongest earthquake anticipated in that area, the NRC says.

But the NRC also says the margin of safety has been reduced.

Update: The NRC on March 19 released answers to frequently asked questions about risks to U.S. nuclear plants from earthquake or tsunami. PDF file.

In the 35 years since Indian Point 3 got its license to operate in 1976, the same era when most of today's U.S. nuclear reactors were built, geologists have learned a lot about the dangers of earthquakes in the eastern and central U.S.

U.S. Geological Survey
Based on 2008 data, a map of earthquake damage risk in the United States. The highest risk areas are purple, red and orange.

U.S. Geological Survey
Based on 1982 data, a map of earthquake damage risk in the continental United States. The highest risk areas are red, yellow and purple.

No one alive now has memories of the South Carolina quakes of 1886, which toppled 14,000 chimneys in Charleston and were felt in 30 states. Or the New Madrid quakes of 1811-1812 in Missouri and Arkansas — the big one made the Mississippi River run backward for a time.

But the geologists and seismologists remember, learning their history from rocks, and steadily raising their estimates of the risk of severe quakes. New faults are found, and new computer models change predictions for how the ground shakes. The latest estimates are drawn from the 2008 maps of the U.S. Geological Survey. Of special note, the USGS said, was an allowance for waves of large earthquakes in the New Madrid fault area roughly centered on the Missouri Bootheel, as well as inclusion of offshore faults near Charleston, S.C., and new data from the mountains of East Tennessee. With each new map, the areas of negligible risks have receded.

Based on those new maps, the NRC published in August 2010 new estimates of the earthquake risk at nuclear power reactors in the eastern and central states. Besides the proximity, severity and frequency of earthquakes, the new estimates take into account the design standards used at each plant, along with the type of rock or soil it's built on. This week, the NRC provided additional data to msnbc.com for the relatively few reactors in the Western states, allowing a ranking to be made of all 104 reactors with the latest data.

The top 10

Here are the 10 nuclear power sites with the highest risk of an earthquake causing core damage, showing their NRC risk estimates based on 2008 and 1989 geological data.

1. Indian Point 3, Buchanan, N.Y.: 1 in 10,000 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 17,241. Increase in risk: 72 percent.

2. Pilgrim 1, Plymouth, Mass.: 1 in 14,493. Old estimate: 1 in 125,000. Increase in risk: 763 percent.

3. Limerick 1 and 2, Limerick, Pa.: 1 in 18,868. Old estimate: 1 in 45,455. Increase in risk: 141 percent.

4. Sequoyah 1 and 2, Soddy-Daisy, Tenn.: 1 in 19,608. Old estimate: 1 in 102,041. Increase in risk: 420 percent.

5. Beaver Valley 1, Shippingport, Pa.: 1 in 20,833. Old estimate: 1 in 76,923. Increase in risk: 269 percent.

6. Saint Lucie 1 and 2, Jensen Beach, Fla.: 1 in 21,739. Old estimate: N/A.

7. North Anna 1 and 2, Louisa, Va.: 1 in 22,727. Old estimate: 1 in 31,250. Increase in risk: 38 percent.

8. Oconee 1, 2 and 3, Seneca, S.C.: 1 in 23,256. Old estimate: 1 in 100,000. Increase in risk: 330 percent.

9. Diablo Canyon 1 and 2, Avila Beach, Calif.: 1 in 23,810. Old estimate: N/A.

10. Three Mile Island, Middletown, Pa.: 1 in 25,000. Old estimate: 1 in 45,455. Increase in risk: 82 percent.

(This short list of the top 10 sites, or plants, groups together reactors at the same site if they have the same risk rating, such as Sequoyah 1 and 2. The full list of 104 separate reactors is below at the bottom of the text.)


Based on 1969 data, a map of earthquake damage risk in the continental United States. The highest risk areas are red and yellow.

A rising risk

Northeast of Chattanooga, Tenn., the Tennessee Valley Authority's Sequoyah 1 and 2 nuclear plants had been thought to have a risk of core damage from an earthquake happening once every 102,041 years. The new estimate is once every 19,608 years.

That kind of change was typical. Out of 104 reactors, the risk estimate declined at only eight. (There were 19 for which no older estimate was available for comparison.)

The increase in risk is so rapid that an NRC research task force in September sent two recommendations to NRC management:

First, it is time to move the issue over from the research staff to the regulatory staff, moving from study to action.

Second, start figuring out whether some nuclear power plants need a "backfit," or additional construction to protect them from earthquakes.

Another indication of how fast the risk estimates rose: The median, or middle value out of all 104 reactors, a measure of the risk at the typical plant, is now at a 1 in 74,176 chance each year of core damage from a quake. In the old estimate, it was 1 in 263,158. In other words, the estimated risk, though still low by NRC standards, has more than tripled.

What happens next?

This NRC process began in 2005 when its staff recommended taking a look at updated seismic hazards. It was late 2008 before NRC staff started working with a contractor, Electric Power Research Institute, on the design of a study. Overall, it took five years and three months from the staff recommendation until the seismic task force submitted its report in August 2010.

One problem is a lack of data about the nuclear reactors themselves. The NRC task force said the agency has detailed data on what it calls plant fragility — the probability that the expected earthquake would damage the reactor's core — for only one-third of the nation's nuclear plants. That's because only the plants that had been thought to be in areas of higher seismic risk had done detailed studies. For the rest, the scientists had to estimate from other information submitted by plant operators.

Now the NRC is playing catch-up.

An NRC spokesman, Scott Burnell, said Tuesday that the NRC is preparing a letter to send to certain nuclear plants, asking them for the more detailed data on equipment, soil conditions and seismic preparedness. Then the plants and NRC staff will have an opportunity to analyze that data.

That process could stretch into 2012, Burnell said. Then the NRC will have to decide, he said, "where the ability to respond to seismic events can be improved."

In the middle of that process, perhaps late this year, a new round of geologic data will come out. That will be folded into new calculations.

Industry is "addressing that issue"

The nuclear power industry is watching this process. A document distributed to the public by the industry's Nuclear Energy Institute on Sunday, after the Japanese plant emergency began, referred to this NRC study and the possibility of changes, saying, "The industry is working with the NRC to develop a methodology for addressing that issue."

The industry statement did not mention that the study increased the estimates of earthquake risk for nearly every nuclear power plant in the U.S.

(One of the leading nuclear power companies, General Electric, which designed the reactors at Fukushima, is a part owner of NBCUniversal, which co-owns msnbc.com through a joint venture with Microsoft.)

Good odds or bad?

How much risk is too much? Is a roller coaster safe only if no one ever dies? If one passenger dies every 100 years? Every year?

When the NRC saw that the new earthquake maps had pushed the level of risk into the range between 1 in 100,000 and the more likely 1 in 10,000, that change was enough to study the issue further, the task force said in its report. But because the risks didn't go beyond 1 in 10,000, "there was no immediate concern regarding adequate protection." The new estimates put Indian Point right at that boundary, and a few others in reach.

By comparison, the chance of winning the grand prize in the next Powerball lottery: 1 in 195,249,054.
Ranking of nuclear reactors by earthquake damage risks
Here are the 104 nuclear power reactors in the United States, ranked by the NRC's estimate of the risk each year that an earthquake would cause damage to the reactor's core, possibly releasing radiation.

Notes: Data come from the NRC's study of August 2010 on reactors in the central and eastern states, supplemented by data provided by the NRC to msnbc.com in March 2011. The table shows the risks calculated separately from 1989 and 2008 earthquake data from the U.S. Geological Survey. Ranks and changes in risk are calculated by msnbc.com. For the reactors in the western states, and a few others, the 1989 estimate was not provided to msnbc.com, so no change is calculated. The information in this list is also available in an Excel spreadsheet file. (See resources, below.)

Rank. Reactor, nearby city, state: Chance each year of core damage from an earthquake, showing NRC estimates based on 2008 USGS data. Old estimate from 1989 data. Change in risk.
1. Indian Point 3, Buchanan, N.Y.: 1 in 10,000 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 17,241. Change in risk: 72 percent.

2. Pilgrim 1, Plymouth, Mass.: 1 in 14,493 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 125,000. Change in risk: 763 percent.

3. Limerick 1, Limerick, Pa.: 1 in 18,868 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 45,455. Change in risk: 141 percent.

3. Limerick 2, Limerick, Pa.: 1 in 18,868 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 45,455. Change in risk: 141 percent.

5. Sequoyah 1, Soddy-Daisy, Tenn.: 1 in 19,608 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 102,041. Change in risk: 420 percent.

5. Sequoyah 2, Soddy-Daisy, Tenn.: 1 in 19,608 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 102,041. Change in risk: 420 percent.

7. Beaver Valley 1, Shippingport, Pa.: 1 in 20,833 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 76,923. Change in risk: 269 percent.

8. Saint Lucie 1, Jensen Beach, Fla.: 1 in 21,739 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.

8. Saint Lucie 2, Jensen Beach, Fla.: 1 in 21,739 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.

10. North Anna 2, Louisa, Va.: 1 in 22,727 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 31,250. Change in risk: 38 percent.

12. Oconee 1, Seneca, S.C.: 1 in 23,256 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 100,000. Change in risk: 330 percent.

12. Oconee 2, Seneca, S.C.: 1 in 23,256 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 100,000. Change in risk: 330 percent.

12. Oconee 3, Seneca, S.C.: 1 in 23,256 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 100,000. Change in risk: 330 percent.

15. Diablo Canyon 1, Avila Beach, Calif.: 1 in 23,810 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.

15. Diablo Canyon 2, Avila Beach, Calif.: 1 in 23,810 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.

17. Three Mile Island 1, Middletown, Pa.: 1 in 25,000 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 45,455. Change in risk: 82 percent.

18. Palo Verde 1, Wintersburg, Ariz.: 1 in 26,316 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.

18. Palo Verde 2, Wintersburg, Ariz.: 1 in 26,316 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.

18. Palo Verde 3, Wintersburg, Ariz.: 1 in 26,316 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.
18. Summer, Jenkensville, S.C.: 1 in 26,316 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 138,889. Change in risk: 428 percent.

22. Catawba 1, York, S.C.: 1 in 27,027 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 33,333. Change in risk: 23 percent.

22. Catawba 2, York, S.C.: 1 in 27,027 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 33,333. Change in risk: 23 percent.

24. Watts Bar 1, Spring City, Tenn.: 1 in 27,778 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 178,571. Change in risk: 543 percent.

25. Indian Point 2, Buchanan, N.Y.: 1 in 30,303 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 71,429. Change in risk: 136 percent.

26. Duane Arnold, Palo, Iowa: 1 in 31,250 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.

27. McGuire 1, Huntersville, N.C.: 1 in 32,258 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 35,714. Change in risk: 11 percent.

27. McGuire 2, Huntersville, N.C.: 1 in 32,258 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 35,714. Change in risk: 11 percent.

29. Farley 1, Columbia, Ala.: 1 in 35,714 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 263,158. Change in risk: 637 percent.

29. Farley 2, Columbia, Ala.: 1 in 35,714 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 263,158. Change in risk: 637 percent.

31. Quad Cities 1, Cordova, Ill.: 1 in 37,037 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 71,429. Change in risk: 93 percent.
31. Quad Cities 2, Cordova, Ill.: 1 in 37,037 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 71,429. Change in risk: 93 percent.

33. River Bend 1, St. Francisville, La.: 1 in 40,000 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 370,370. Change in risk: 826 percent.

34. Peach Bottom 2, Delta, Pa.: 1 in 41,667 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 120,482. Change in risk: 189 percent.

34. Peach Bottom 3, Delta, Pa.: 1 in 41,667 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 120,482. Change in risk: 189 percent.

36. Crystal River 3, Crystal River, Fla.: 1 in 45,455 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 192,308. Change in risk: 323 percent.

36. Seabrook 1, Seabrook, N.H.: 1 in 45,455 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 114,943. Change in risk: 153 percent.

36. Beaver Valley 2, Shippingport, Pa.: 1 in 45,455 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 188,679. Change in risk: 315 percent.

39. Perry 1, Perry, Ohio: 1 in 47,619 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 1,176,471. Change in risk: 2371 percent.

39. Columbia 1, Richland, Wash.: 1 in 47,619 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.

41. Waterford 3, Killona, La.: 1 in 50,000 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 833,333. Change in risk: 1567 percent.

42. Dresden 2, Morris, Ill.: 1 in 52,632 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 434,783. Change in risk: 726 percent.
42. Dresden 3, Morris, Ill.: 1 in 52,632 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 434,783. Change in risk: 726 percent.

42. Monticello, Monticello, Minn.: 1 in 52,632 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 38,462. Change in risk: -27 percent.

45. Wolf Creek 1, Burlington, Kansas: 1 in 55,556 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 400,000. Change in risk: 620 percent.

46. San Onofre 2, San Clemente, Calif.: 1 in 58,824 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.

46. San Onofre 3, San Clemente, Calif.: 1 in 58,824 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.

48. Millstone 3, Waterford, Conn.: 1 in 66,667 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 100,000. Change in risk: 50 percent.

48. Brunswick 1, Southport, N.C.: 1 in 66,667 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 263,158. Change in risk: 295 percent.

48. Brunswick 2, Southport, N.C.: 1 in 66,667 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 263,158. Change in risk: 295 percent.

48. Robinson 2, Hartsville, S.C.: 1 in 66,667 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 370,370. Change in risk: 456 percent.

52. Oyster Creek, Forked River, N.J.: 1 in 71,429 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 126,582. Change in risk: 77 percent.

53. Fort Calhoun, Fort Calhoun, Neb.: 1 in 76,923 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.

53. Ginna, Ontario, N.Y.: 1 in 76,923 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 238,095. Change in risk: 210 percent.

53. Susquehanna 1, Salem Township, Pa.: 1 in 76,923 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 416,667. Change in risk: 442 percent.

53. Susquehanna 2, Salem Township, Pa.: 1 in 76,923 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 416,667. Change in risk: 442 percent.

57. Calvert Cliffs 2, Lusby, Md.: 1 in 83,333 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 116,279. Change in risk: 40 percent.

57. D.C. Cook 1, Bridgman, Mich.: 1 in 83,333 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.

57. D.C. Cook 2, Bridgman, Mich.: 1 in 83,333 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.

57. Grand Gulf 1, Port Gibson, Miss.: 1 in 83,333 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 106,383. Change in risk: 28 percent.

57. Kewaunee, Kewaunee, Wis.: 1 in 83,333 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 71,429. Change in risk: -14 percent.

62. Millstone 2, Waterford, Conn.: 1 in 90,909 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 156,250. Change in risk: 72 percent.

62. Point Beach 1, Two Rivers, Wis.: 1 in 90,909 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 76,923. Change in risk: -15 percent.

62. Point Beach 2, Two Rivers, Wis.: 1 in 90,909 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 76,923. Change in risk: -15 percent.

67. Turkey Point 3, Homestead, Fla.: 1 in 100,000 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.

67. Turkey Point 4, Homestead, Fla.: 1 in 100,000 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.

67. Calvert Cliffs 1, Lusby, Md.: 1 in 100,000 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 142,857. Change in risk: 43 percent.

70. Vermont Yankee, Vernon, Vt.: 1 in 123,457 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 434,783. Change in risk: 252 percent.

71. Braidwood 1, Braceville, Ill.: 1 in 136,986 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 1,785,714. Change in risk: 1204 percent.

71. Braidwood 2, Braceville, Ill.: 1 in 136,986 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 1,785,714. Change in risk: 1204 percent.

73. Vogtle 1, Waynesboro, Ga.: 1 in 140,845 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 384,615. Change in risk: 173 percent.

73. Vogtle 2, Waynesboro, Ga.: 1 in 140,845 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 384,615. Change in risk: 173 percent.

75. Cooper, Brownville, Neb.: 1 in 142,857 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.
76. Davis-Besse, Oak Harbor, Ohio: 1 in 149,254 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 625,000. Change in risk: 319 percent.

77. Palisades, Covert, Mich.: 1 in 156,250 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.

78. South Texas 1, Bay City, Texas: 1 in 158,730 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 1,298,701. Change in risk: 718 percent.

78. South Texas 2, Bay City, Texas: 1 in 158,730 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 1,298,701. Change in risk: 718 percent.

80. FitzPatrick, Scriba, N.Y.: 1 in 163,934 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 833,333. Change in risk: 408 percent.

81. Byron 1, Byron, Ill.: 1 in 172,414 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 1,470,588. Change in risk: 753 percent.

81. Byron 2, Byron, Ill.: 1 in 172,414 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 1,470,588. Change in risk: 753 percent.

83. Surry 1, Surry, Va.: 1 in 175,439 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 123,457. Change in risk: -30 percent.

83. Surry 2, Surry, Va.: 1 in 175,439 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 123,457. Change in risk: -30 percent.

85. Nine Mile Point 2, Scriba, N.Y.: 1 in 178,571 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 1,000,000. Change in risk: 460 percent.

86. Browns Ferry 2, Athens, Ala.: 1 in 185,185 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 625,000. Change in risk: 238 percent.
86. Browns Ferry 3, Athens, Ala.: 1 in 185,185 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 625,000. Change in risk: 238 percent.

88. Nine Mile Point 1, Scriba, N.Y.: 1 in 238,095 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 1,724,138. Change in risk: 624 percent.

88. Fermi 2, Monroe, Mich.: 1 in 238,095 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 625,000. Change in risk: 163 percent.

90. Arkansas Nuclear 1, London, Ark.: 1 in 243,902 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 1,063,830. Change in risk: 336 percent.

90. Arkansas Nuclear 2, London, Ark.: 1 in 243,902 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 1,063,830. Change in risk: 336 percent.

92. Comanche Peak 1, Glen Rose, Texas: 1 in 250,000 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 833,333. Change in risk: 233 percent.

92. Comanche Peak 2, Glen Rose, Texas: 1 in 250,000 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 833,333. Change in risk: 233 percent.

94. Browns Ferry 1, Athens, Ala.: 1 in 270,270 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 1,000,000. Change in risk: 270 percent.

95. Prairie Island 1, Welch, Minn.: 1 in 333,333 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 714,286. Change in risk: 114 percent.

95. Prairie Island 2, Welch, Minn.: 1 in 333,333 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 714,286. Change in risk: 114 percent.

97. La Salle 1, Marseilles, Ill.: 1 in 357,143 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 1,851,852. Change in risk: 419 percent.
97. La Salle 2, Marseilles, Ill.: 1 in 357,143 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 1,851,852. Change in risk: 419 percent.

97. Hope Creek 1, Hancocks Bridge, N.J.: 1 in 357,143 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 909,091. Change in risk: 155 percent.

100. Clinton, Clinton, Ill.: 1 in 400,000 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 370,370. Change in risk: -7 percent.

101. Shearon Harris 1, New Hill, N.C.: 1 in 434,783 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 277,778. Change in risk: -36 percent.

102. Hatch 1, Baxley, Ga.: 1 in 454,545 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 1,351,351. Change in risk: 197 percent.

102. Hatch 2, Baxley, Ga.: 1 in 454,545 chance each year. Old estimate: 1 in 1,351,351. Change in risk: 197 percent.

104. Callaway, Fulton, Mo.: 1 in 500,000 chance each year. Old estimate: N/A. Change in risk: N/A.

A few words about the data (Where's Richter?)

The NRC's risk estimates are not based on the usual layman's language of the magnitude scale (the old Richter scale or its replacement, the moment magnitude scale). Magnitude shows the earthquake's energy released. That is a measure of power.

But a nuclear plant may be close to the epicenter of a quake, or far from it. And some types of seismic waves are more jarring than others.

Instead, these risk estimates consider how violently the ground will shake at the nuclear plant, considered a better indication of how much damage it will cause. That shaking can be affected by the depth, distance from the epicenter, and the frequencies of waves that the quake emits. The shaking is expressed in a unit called peak ground acceleration, in terms of the acceleration caused by the Earth's gravity. This is a measure of intensity.

Often these two ways of measuring earthquakes are roughly in synch, but sometimes not. For example:

The 2010 Haiti earthquake, magnitude 7.0, rated only "severe" on the intensity scale, the third rung from the top, with peak ground acceleration of 0.5 times the Earth's gravity.

The 2010 Chile earthquake, with a much higher magnitude of 8.8, was one step higher in terms of intensity, "violent," with peak ground acceleration of 0.65 times gravity.

The 2010 Christchurch or Canterbury earthquake in New Zealand, similar to Haiti at magnitude 7.1, was at the top of the intensity scale, "extreme," with a peak ground acceleration of 1.26 times gravity.

Besides the peak acceleration, the NRC made other estimates for each nuclear plant, based on different types of earthquakes.

From all these estimates, the NRC calculated a worst case, which it called the "weakest link." Msnbc.com ranked the plants by that worst case, which is the same number the NRC staff highlights in its report, and the only number it provided for the reactors in the western states.

Resources

These links open in a new window.

NRC answers to frequently asked questions on earthquake and tsunami risk. PDF file.

Earthquake history of each state, from the USGS.

More investigative reports
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Fed lent banks nearly $8 trillion during crisis, report shows
Pakistan's 'Memogate' triggers U.S. ambassador's resignation
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A USGS brochure describing the changes in the 2008 seismic hazard maps. PDF file.

The NRC report with new earthquake risk estimates, "Generic Issue 199 (GI-199), Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern United States on Existing Plants, Safety/Risk Assessment," August 2010. PDF file. Note: Data for individual reactors are in appendix D.

An NRC fact sheet from November 2010, "Seismic Issues for Existing Nuclear Power Plants."

The NRC database of active nuclear reactors in the U.S. Each reactor name links to technical and safety documents.

Industry response to questions about the situation in Japan. PDF file.

A scientific paper describing the New Madrid earthquake, and what can be learned by melding modern science with writings from long ago.

A brochure with a table comparing values for magnitude and peak ground acceleration.

The ranking of 104 nuclear plants by risk, by msnbc.com from NRC data, in an Excel spreadsheet file.

 

[Opmmur]

Study: Japan feared 'devil's chain reaction' at nuke plant
By msnbc.com news services

Japan's prime minister ordered workers to remain at the tsunami-crippled Fukushima nuclear plant last March as fears mounted of a "devil's chain reaction" that would force tens of millions of people to flee Tokyo, a new investigative report shows.

Then-Premier Naoto Kan and his staff began referring to a worst-case scenario that could threaten Japan's existence as a nation around three days after the March 11 earthquake and tsunami, according to the report by a panel set up by a private think-tank.

That was when fears mounted that thousands of spent fuel rods stored at a damaged reactor would melt and spew radiation after a hydrogen explosion at an adjacent reactor building, according to the panel report.

Yukio Edano, then Japan's top government spokesman, told the panel that at the height of tension he feared a "devil's chain reaction" in which the Fukushima Daiichi plant and the nearby Fukushima Daini facility, as well as the Tokai nuclear plant, spiraled out of control, putting the capital at risk.

Kan, who stepped down last September, came under fire for his handling of the crisis, including flying over the plant by helicopter the morning after the disasters hit -- a move some critics said contributed to a delay in the operator's response.

Kan, 65, has spoken of how he was haunted by the specter of a crisis spiraling out of control and forcing the evacuation of the Tokyo greater metropolitan area, 150 miles away and home to some 35 million people.

The private Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation report also said Japan's government withheld information about the full danger of last year's nuclear disaster from its own people and from the United States, putting U.S.-Japan relations at risk in the first days after the accident.

The report, compiled from interviews with more than 300 people, delivers a scathing view of how leaders played down the risks of the meltdowns at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant that followed a massive March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami.

It paints a picture of confusion during the days immediately after the accident and says the U.S. government was frustrated by the scattered information provided by Japan and was skeptical whether it was true.

The U.S. advised Americans to leave an area within 50 miles of the plant, far bigger than the 12-mile Japanese evacuation area, because of concerns that the accident was worse than Japan was reporting.

The misunderstandings were gradually cleared up after a bilateral committee was set up on March 22 and began regular meetings, according to the 400-page report.

The report, compiled by scholars, lawyers and other experts, credits then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan for ordering Tokyo Electric Power Co., the utility running the plant, not to withdraw its staff and to keep fighting to bring it under control.

TEPCO's president at the time, Masataka Shimizu, called Kan on March 15 and said he wanted to abandon the plant and have all 600 TEPCO staff flee, the report said. That would have allowed the situation to spiral out of control, resulting in a much larger release of radiation.

A group of about 50 workers was eventually able to bring the plant under control.

TEPCO, which declined to take part in the investigation, has denied it planned to abandon Fukushima Dai-ichi. The report notes the denial, but says Kan and other officials had the clear understanding that TEPCO had asked to leave.

But the report criticizes Kan for attempting to micromanage the disaster and for not releasing critical information on radiation leaks, thereby creating widespread distrust of the authorities among Japanese.

Kan's office did not immediately respond to requests for comment on the report.

Kan acknowledged in a recent interview with The Associated Press that the release of information was sometimes slow and at times wrong. He blamed a lack of reliable data at the time and denied the government hid such information from the public.

It will take decades to fully decommission Fukushima Dai-ichi. Although one of the damaged reactor buildings has been repaired, others remain in shambles. A group of journalists, including a reporter from The Associated Press, were given a tour of the plant on Tuesday.

Workers have used tape to mend cracks caused by freezing weather in plastic hoses on temporary equipment installed to cool the hobbled reactors.

"I have to acknowledge that they are still rather fragile," plant chief Takeshi Takahashi said of the safety measures.

The area is still contaminated with radiation, complicating the work. It already has involved hundreds of thousands of workers, who have to quit when they reach the maximum allowed radiation exposure of 100 millisieverts a year.

The report includes a document describing a worst-case scenario that Kan and the chief of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission secretly discussed two weeks after the disaster.

That scenario involved the possibility of more nuclear fuel rods burning, causing the release of more radiation and requiring the evacuation of a much wider region, including Tokyo.

The report also concludes that government oversight of nuclear plant safety had been inadequate, ignoring the risk of tsunami and the need for plant design renovations, and instead clinging to a "myth of safety."

"The idea of upgrading a plant was taboo," said Koichi Kitazawa, a scholar who heads the commission that prepared the report. "We were just lucky that Japan was able to avoid the worst-case scenario. But there is no guarantee this kind of luck will prevail next time."

After the quake and tsunami struck, three reactors melted down and radiation spewed widely through eastern Japan, forcing tens of thousands of residents to evacuate from the area around the plant.

TEPCO managed to avert the worst scenario by pumping water, much of it from the sea, into Dai-ichi's damaged reactors and spent fuel pools. The reactors were stabilized by December.

A year after the disaster, however, Fukushima Dai-ichi still resembles a vast wasteland. High radiation levels hamper a cleanup that is expected to take decades.

The damaged 125-foot-tall No. 2 reactor building stands like a bird's nest of twisted steel beams. A TEPCO official who accompanied foreign media to the plant on Tuesday said metal debris was being painstakingly removed by giant cranes and other equipment as radiation doses were too high for workers.

Another challenge is keeping a new cooling system, built from a myriad of technologies and prone to breaking down, running without major glitches.

"An earthquake or tsunami like the ones seen a year ago could be a source of trouble for these (cooling) systems. But we are currently reinforcing the spent fuel pool and making the sea walls higher against tsunamis," Takeshi Takahashi, the Dai-ichi plant's manager, told reporters. "A series of backup systems is also being put in place in case one fails."

Edano on Tuesday acknowledged he had feared the worst around March 14-15. "I was working with a strong sense of crisis that under various circumstances, such a thing may be possible," he told a news conference in Tokyo.

But he defended his silence as government spokesman.

"I shared all information. Back then, I was not in a position where I, as someone who is not an expert, could irresponsibly speak about my own personal impressions and my sense of crisis," he told a news conference.

"I conveyed assessments and decisions of the government, government agencies and experts," he added.

The panel report said some of Kan's seemingly inexplicable behavior stemmed from his belief that TEPCO was going to abandon the plant and the accident would spiral out of control.

An irate Kan blasted TEPCO on March 15, yelling: "What the hell is going on" in an outburst overheard by a Kyodo News reporter and quickly reported around the globe. "I want you all to be determined," he was quoted as telling utility executives.

The utility ultimately left a corps of workers who were dubbed the "Fukushima Fifty" by media and won admiration at home and abroad as they risked their lives to contain the crisis, although their names were never formally made public.